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 INTRODUCTION1 
 
The global commons – non-terrestrial spaces accessible to all and owned by none – are currently a 
major concern for government administrations2. Maintaining an access to them is a key necessity 
both for the deployment of the armed forces and the functioning of the globalised economy. No 
State can intervene militarily while ensuring its own prosperity without being assured of its access to 
the international airspace3, the atmosphere4, the high seas5 and cyberspace6. 
 
Only ten years ago, the United States had a form of monopoly over these spaces. Today, the rivalry of 
the emerging powers is intensifying, meaning there is a posture of “access denial” being taken, in the 
form of a campaign carried out over long distances.  This campaign operates through the use of 
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long-range intelligence and surveillance systems, anti-satellite 
systems, long-range submarines, resources for cyber attacks and even terrorist action against the 
American forces and bases.  Another aspect of the campaign is area denial to those spaces that are in 
close proximity to the adversary. This is implemented mainly by air assets, air defence systems, short-
range missiles, submarines and naval mines. In both cases (access denial and area denial), the aim is 
to limit the reach of American “domination” in armed intervention. 
 
 
How is the global commons concept currently approached in US doctrine? What is its role in the 
grand strategy that the US is attempting to implement today? How are the emerging economies 
approaching this issue, given that they object to America’s control in this domain in recent years?  
 
One of the goals of this study is to clarify the concept of the global commons in American defence 
policy and pinpoint its doctrinal development in key official documents adopted since 2010 and as 
part of the preparation for the QDR 2014: QDR 2010, Defense Strategic Guidance 2012, 2011 Air-
Sea Battle concept, 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Chairman's Strategic Direction 
to the Joint Force (CSDJF), Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 2012, Joint Forcible Entry 
Operations. 
 
However, the approach taken will not consist in analysing the decision-making process within 
government departments in the US and other countries chosen for the study (identifying 
bureaucratic debates among the different forces or between the military and political leaders), nor 
                                                          
1
 The author would like to acknowledge the documentary assistance of Mathilde Boutaricq. 
2
 The term “global commons” must be taken here to mean the resource domains only and not the “common 
goods” that may be obtained in these spaces, nor the “common heritage” that may result from their existence. 
The topic under study focuses on the spatial aspect rather than issues of global governance. For further 
information on the different aspects of the concept (from heritage to common resource pools), see Yves 
Schemeil, “Les biens publics premiers : Babel, côté cour, côté jardin” in François Constantin, dir., Les Biens 
publics mondiaux. Un mythe légitimateur pour l'action collective, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2002, p. 106. 
3
 The main transport means for people, as well as being a space through which high-value commercial goods 
transit. 
4
 The area in which long-distance communications are established. 
5
 The high seas cover 71% of the world's surface and are the means of transport for 90% of global goods trade.  
6
  The most efficient and least costly medium. 
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does it seek to clarify the meaning of global commons in American doctrine from a political theory 
perspective. It will look at the extent to which the global commons are a major military challenge in 
the first half of the 21st century, as the concept is a key feature in the grand strategy developed by 
the United States, and provokes reactions among the main emerging economies, primarily China and 
Russia.  
 
The first part of this paper will take an approach guided by strategic thinking in order to reveal the 
attributes of these global “commons” from a military standpoint (I). The second takes a look at the US 
grand strategy, both as an epicentre and a disseminator of the concept of the global commons (II). 
The third part outlines how emerging powers such as China and Russia envisage the “global 
commons” as a term, as well as the resulting strategic issues (III). The final section will put forth a 
series of transformations that the global commons reveal on the world strategy stage (IV). 
 
 
 
 THE GLOBAL COMMONS FROM A “STRATEGIC THINKING” PERSPECTIVE 
 
In political theory, the notion of the “commons” designates a space available to all but which is 
destined to fall into decline over time, since its users shirk the costs of maintaining it. Acting as 
"freeriders", each wants to consume the resources of these spaces without having to contribute to 
their replenishment over time. At the beginning of the 1970s, the ecologist Garret Hardin brough the 
concept to the international level by identifying a new tragedy: the environment is endangered due 
to the excessive consumption of ecological resources. Negative externalities such as pollution lead to 
a scenario of destruction: the depletion of the planet’s natural capacities. While the author is deeply 
skeptical, he calls for a transformation in how natural resources are managed, which is one step in 
the necessary protection of the global commons7.   
 
While strategic thinking provides a similar definition of the commons and their purpose (spaces 
accessible to all), it does not seek to reflect on the establishment of global governance to protect 
them. The heart of the reflection is found elsewhere, in that it concerns primarily the deployment of 
the armed forces via, or even by use of, these spaces. Two aspects can thus be discerned: the 
identification of a strategic homology (emphasizing the specifics that these environments share) and 
the debatable nature of a strategy unique to these spaces (outlining a structure with strategic 
constants). 
 
 
FROM THE SEA TO CYBERSPACE: A HOMOLOGY OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS 
 
The high seas, airspace and the atmosphere, cyberspace: all are characterised by what we can refer 
to as a “flat” plane8, even fluid as opposed to solid9. While lands are segmented and subject to 
                                                          
7
 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, 162, 1968, p. 1244. 
 
8
 Joseph Henrotin, “Géostratégie et vision de la mer dans les conflits terrestres. L'interfaçage entre le lisse et 
ACCESS TO THE GLOBAL COMMONS AND GRAND STRATEGIES 
8 
 
fractures according to their topography, all four spaces of the commons are governed by the notion 
of flow. The aim is not to exercise territorial control over these spaces but rather to ensure the 
durability of the flows of goods and people through them. 
 
However, it is important to point out that their flat or fluid nature does not prevent the presence of 
junction points, which are essential not only for the access to these spaces but to ensure their 
existence as such. These junction points may be ports or shipowners for the seas, launchers and 
satellites for space, the submarine cable networks and internet servers, for example. 
 
Going beyond their “smooth” or fluid nature, these spaces have two other similar features that relate 
to the sea. Firstly, their functionality is dependent on the upkeep of communication instruments, 
considered as vital for a nation to run properly. Corbett distinguishes the marine and land 
environments in this report on communications: 
 
“the control of communications, and not, like on land, the conquest of a territory. There is a 
fundamental difference. It is true that land strategy is said to be (and correctly so) mainly a question 
of communications, but the meaning of communications here is different. It concerns the military’s 
own communications and not the signifantly greater communications network that is a vital element of 
a nation. (...) By occupying our maritime communications, closing the doors to where they lead, we 
are destroying the nation’s life at sea and the nation’s life on land, because one depends on the 
other.” 10 
 
Today, economies cannot survive without the spatial and electronic resources that enable increasingly 
faster communication exchanges.  We can therefore affirm that the three other spaces (air, space and 
cyber) follow the same logic as the marine environment, which is one based on the control of 
communications. 
 
A second characteristic shared among the global commons is the role of the offensive when launched 
in their midst. Alfred Mahan identified a unique feature of the sea battle, which comes from its 
physical form. Unlike the land filled with obstacles, the sea is open.  There is almost total 
freedom of movement. From this perspective, the nature of the marine environment, according to 
Mahan, wreaks havoc with the superiority of defensive action identified by Clausewitz, claiming it is 
an open space that favours the attacker11. For Liddle Hart, the control of the seas requires a nation to 
deny the enemy access to the area, which comes down to destroying the naval forces. He then 
compares naval power, not to a flash of light, but to the effects of radium: “beneficial to those who 
are protected, while destructive to the tissue of those who are exposed to it”12. 
 
This offensive component also appears with the use of the air force, but to a greater extent. The first 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
le strié”  in Etudes marines, January 2013, 3, p. 169 and s. 
9
 In terms defined by Laurent Henninger, “Espaces solides et espaces fluides, nouvelles réalités stratégiques”, 
Revue Défense nationale, October 2012. 
10
 (Translation) Julian C. Corbett, Principes de stratégie maritime, Paris, Economica, 1993, p. 89. 
11
 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan et la maîtrise des mers, texts chosen and presented by Pierre Naville, éditions 
Berger-Levrault, 1981. This point of view is a cause for debate, however. See for example Corbett, op. Cit., p. 
49. According to Corbette, there is room for a defensive maneuver with the use of protected moorings. 
12
 Basil Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, Spellmoint, Staplehust, 1999, p. 168. 
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experiment dates to November 1st 1911 during the Italian-Turkish war and the bombing of the Ain-
Zara camp in Libya. During a reconnaissance mission, the pilot struck a camp. The target was 
therefore no longer composed uniquely of combatants fighting at the front. An oasis that 
contributed to the functioning of the area concerned was also struck. As such, “with aviation, it is 
possible to strike not just the armed forces, but an entire socio-economic system”13. As indicated by 
Douhet, who identifies a real continuum between naval and air force strategic thinking, aviation 
oversteps the 2-D perspective in ridiculing the battlefront.  It blurs the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants because it “crosses lines”: “everything, since the birth of humanity, 
that imposed the conditions of war and determined its essential characteristics, no longer plays any 
part in air operations”14.  
 
To a large extent, cyberspace also enables the development of offensive action. For Stéphane Dossé 
and Olivier Kempf, what has changed is the fact that offensive hostile action can now be carried out 
by states anonymously15. It is also an underlying demonstration of the term “cool war” used in the 
conception of cyberwar. The adjective “cool” gives the idea of being fashionable or “in”, and also a 
posture that consists in continuously striking the adversary’s system without declaring a “hot”16 war. 
As such, controlling these spaces means preventing the others from accessing these communication 
circuits, including by offensive means. 
 
Nonetheless, can we decide that a specific strategy is necessary for these spaces? The birth of the 
cyber space as a field of strategic innovation solidifies the classic reawakening of the land and sea 
debate.  On the one hand, the disciples of the technological revolution believe that cyberspace is 
causing a radical transformation both in warfare (the mode of combat) and war itself. The attrition 
objective that characterises the clashes between industrialised powers would give way to combat 
that does not destroy the adversary (the aim of cyber attacks is to paralyse without spilling blood)17 
but also an absence of clear, true victories or defeats. On the other hand, many are against this idea 
of a decisive branching off in the sense that “cyberwar will be one of the resources that will provide 
more or less direct support to high-tech elements”.18It is a weapon that supports all types of 
operations. In other words, “cyberwar is still war”19. A new environment increases the complexity of 
the strategy, but it does not change the nature of war as a dual relationship20. 
 
                                                          
13
 Thomas Hippler, “Cent ans de bombardements aériens. Histoire d'une technique militaire et politique”, La 
Revue des livres, 2, November December 2011, p. 10. 
14
 Giulio Douhet, La maîtrise de l'air, Paris, Economica, 2007, p. 57. 
15
 Stéphane Dossé, Olivier Kempf, dir., Stratégie dans le cyberespace, Paris, Cahier AGS, Esprit du Livre, 2011. 
16
 David Rothkof, “De la guerre froide à la guerre cool”, Courrier international, March 6, 2013. 
17
 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy, 12, 2, Spring 1993, pp. 141-
165. 
18
 Colin Gray, La guerre au 21 ème siècle, Paris, Economica, 2007, p. 282. 
19
 Ibid., p. 297. We must also point out that cyberwar can bring the perspectives of asymmetric warfare up to 
date, in that competent persons (hackers), whether acting alone or for an organization, can carry out 
cyberattacks targeting state powers. See Josef Schröfl, Hybrid and Cyber War as Consequences of the 
Asymmetry, Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 2011. 
20
 While he believes cyberwar to considerably change strategic relationships, Klaus-Gerd Giesen considers that 
this type of confrontation cannot escape the principles of just war, i.e. the strategic players must bend to the 
rules of jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum in this field. See Klaus-Gerd Giesen, “Towards a Theory of 
Just Cyberwar”, Journal of Information Warfare, 12, 1, 2013, pp. 22-31. 
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FROM SPECIFIC STRATEGIES TO THE NOTION OF A GRAND STRATEGY 
 
This debate between specific strategies and a single strategy is nothing other than the debate 
between relativists and essentialists. As Hervé Coutau-Bégarie points out: “War takes place both on 
land and at sea. This brings us to the key question which continues to go unanswered: is there one 
Strategy, with universally valid principles, or are there several strategies, the rules of which vary 
depending on the environment?”21 The goal here is not to choose one over the other but rather to 
point out a level of analysis that leads to the formulation of two constants. 
 
The debate between essentialists and relativists may, to a certain extent, be approached according to 
the operational and tactical levels. However, it can also be approached from the political-strategic 
perspective. If we stick to this last angle in our thinking process, points of convergence appear. This 
helps us identify the constants, which relativise the notion of a strategic isolate that could be applied 
to these environments22. 
 
The first of these constants aims to guarantee freedom of action. Accessing the global commons, 
performing operations within them or basing operations there are all aspects of this approach that 
seeks to enable strategic maneuvers, including recourse to armed force.  The affirmation of General 
Abrial, who believed that “he who has the sky has freedom of action on the ground”, can indeed be 
applied to space and cyberspace23. This strategic freedom of action also requires an interface 
between civil and military logic: lasting flows, supplies and more generally, the protection of the 
commons, furthers civilian freedom of action. 
 
The corollary, which is the second constant, consists in preventing others from carrying out action in 
these spaces, or at least restricting their room for maneuver within them. The task is therefore to 
neutralise the enemy’s action. 
 
These two constants are interpreted in varying ways depending on the political-strategic objectives set 
out by the political leaders. This brings us back to the notion of a grand strategy. For Colin Gray, this 
corresponds to “managing and making use of the advantages of a community of security, including 
its military instruments, in order to fulfil the public action objectives set out by politicians”24. It 
involves reaching a consensus on priorities, creating coherence between the endpoints and the 
means to reach them, guiding the development of the state power’s resources, and producing 
synergy between the different fields of application of its resources25. A grand strategy is an integral 
element for international power26, even though in reality it often appears incomplete at the empirical 
                                                          
21
 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Traité de stratégie, 5ème édition, Paris, Economica, 2006, p. 542. 
22
 Corbett before him pointed out battle at sea is always linked to a land objective at some point. Even if a 
different aspect of sea combat exists, the strategists’s logic does not change. It stays the same. The questions 
raised by the deployment of the naval forces are not unrelated. The political-strategic aim at land and at sea 
cannot differ.  
23
 Speech by Air Force General Stéphane Abrial, Chief, Army Reserve (CEMAR), before the 59th session of the 
IHEN, Paris, March 7, 2007.  
24
 Colin Gray, The Strategy Bridge, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 18. 
25
 Franck Hoffmann, “Forward Partnership: A Sustainable American Strategy”, Orbis, Winter 2013, p. 22. 
26
 Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Towards a Broader Definition”, in Paul Kennedy, ed., 
Grand Strategies in War and Peace, New Haven: University Press, 1991, p. 4-5. See also Liddel Hart, Strategy, 
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level27. However – and this is a key aspect of the analysis – there is a perceptible trend in the discourse 
on the American grand strategy in place today: the incorporating of the global commons as one of its 
cornerstones. Like the White Papers on defence studied by Lucien Poirier28, the documents adopted 
by the Obama administration that report on this grand strategy act as ontological indicators at the 
strategic level. They highlight the ways that a political group defines its position and role in the world. 
 
 
 
 THE GLOBAL COMMONS SERVING A GRAND STRATEGY IN THE U.S. 
 
While the very notion of the global commons is nothing new on the far side of the Atlantic, it has 
been reinvigorated under the Obama administration. This is not without consequence in NATO 
discussions on the future of the Alliance’s functions. This interest is due to an ongoing global 
situation in which these spaces are being used for military purposes and states’ attempts to seize 
them for their strategic value. The outbreak of cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007 and the malfunctions 
in the Iranian nuclear programme due to the Stuxnet computer worm are a good example of the use 
of the commons for military purposes. The maritime claims in Asia, in particular by China, are an 
example of the desire of countries to seize these spaces. How does the Obama administration see 
the global commons? 
 
 
THE “GLOBAL COMMONS” CONCEPT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The concept of the global commons is first and foremost tied to the “anti-access” phenomenon, 
which “through military and political means, aims to hinder or prevent a force deployment 
operation”29. This means a no-fly or marine exclusion zone is established by the United States, 
preventing access to the “global commons”30.  Such an approach encourages the U.S. to widen their 
strategic objectives in a post Cold War context31. But these choices are also a result of the experience 
gained during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq. At that time, military staff suggested a conceptual 
overhaul inspired by the man who would become the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), Admiral Stavridis32. This innovative thinking was already a main feature of the Quadrennial 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
New York, Meridian, 1991, p. 332. 
27
 Analyses have stressed that a grand strategy is rarely effective. See Williamson Murray, Richard Hart 
Sinnreich, James Lacey, eds., The Shaping of Grand Strategy, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 
4. 
28
 See in particular Lucien Poirier, La crise des fondements, Paris, Economica, 1994, p. 179. 
29
 Corentin Brustlein, “Vers la fin de la projection de forces? 1. La menace du déni d'accès”, Focus stratégique, 
April 2010, IFRI, p. 7. 
30
 For Posen, “anti-access” applies to the contested zones located in close proximity to the enemy. The closer 
the U.S. approaches, the greater the resources of the enemy to disrupt the deployment of forces enabled by its 
control of the global commons. We can, however, point to the appearance of a trend of exporting anti-access 
actions within the global commons through the enhancement of naval or antisatellite capabilities. 
31
 Todd Sandler, “After the Cold War, secure the Global commons”, Challenge, 35, 4, July-August 1992. 
32
 James Stavridis, USN, A New Air Sea Battle Concept: Integrated Strike Forces, Washington D.C., National 
ACCESS TO THE GLOBAL COMMONS AND GRAND STRATEGIES 
12 
 
Defense Review in 2001, under the initiative of Donald Rumsfeld. However, the interventions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan impose another agenda, not without causing debate among military staff concerning 
asset employment (from counter-insurrection to interstate war)33. With the gradual disengagement 
from these two theatres, the concept of the global commons is becoming a structuring element of 
the American posture34. It is therefore less an emergence of a new concept in strategic thinking than 
the reawakening of an old one35. How can it be explained and in what does it reside? 
 
There are two main reasons behind this renewed interest in the global commons. Firstly, the 
projection of the armed forces as part of expeditionary operations is no longer limited to the task 
organisation of the air, land and navy components. Two new fields are essential to successfully carry 
out these tasks: space and cyberspace. This requires greater coordination between the branches: 
“simultaneous access to the different dimensions of the global commons as well as freedom of action 
within them are essential”36. The success of an operation depends on the cumulated control of these 
different domains. Worse still, a visible weakness in one of the domains (international waters, 
international airspace, the atmosphere, cyberspace) has a domino effect on the others. General 
Michael Moseley, former Chief of Staff of the US Air Force warns: “since the air, space and 
cyberspace domains are increasingly interdependent, the loss of control of one can lead to a loss of 
control of the others...No future war can be won without superiority in the air, space and 
cyberspace”37. This diagnosis is based on the necessity to take into consideration the relevant 
strategic aspects (i.e. their militarisation, or the use of these spaces in support of military 
operations)38. Among the zones considered as priority, the QDR 2010 identified the Asia-Pacific 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Defense University National War College, 1992. 
33
 The well-known COIN operation is becoming subject to increasingly virulent criticism. For an example of 
constant opposition, see Gian P. Gentile, “A Different US Military Narrative”, Politique américaine, 17, Autumn 
2010, pp. 115-121. 
34
 John T. Bennett, “Pentagon Crafting Anti-Access Concept”, Defense news, January 25, 2010. 
35
 Emergence here means “the moment when an idea, which may already exist latently, becomes a specific 
conceptual thing, with a name and/or substance, awakening new interest". Philippe Gros, et a., dir., “Du 
Network centric à la stabilisation: émergence de nouveaux concepts et innovation militaire”, Etudes de l'Irsem 
6, 2011, p. 49. 
36
 Mark E. Redden and Michael P. Hughes, “Global Commons and Domain Interrelationships: Time for a New 
Conceptual Framework?”, Strategic forum no. 259, National Defense University, November 2010, p. 2. 
 
37
 General T. Michael Moseley, USAF, “The Nation's Guardians: America's 21st Century Air Force”, Chief of Staff 
of the Air Force, White Paper, Washington, DC, December 29, 2007, 2. 
38
 The cyber situation is quite emblematic of such a process, as can be evidenced in the formation of a US Cyber 
Command in 2010 within strategic command and the publication of a report in May 2011 by the Pentagon on 
the defense strategy for operations in cyberspace (see “Le Pentagone pourrait assimiler les cyberattaques à des 
actes de guerre”, Le Monde, 3 June 2011). This document incorporates cyber into strategic thinking based on 
three complementary angles relative to the source, qualification and consequences of a cyberattack. First of all, 
a threat coming from the cybernetic vector can never come from a transnational source alone. Any attack, as 
soon as it is far-reaching, has State support. Secondly, as cyberattacks target strategic structures such as nuclear 
power stations or transport routes for energy sources, they are qualified as acts of war. Thirdly, and as a result, 
the relationship induces the notion of equivalence. By way of retaliation and reciprocity, the victim State 
entitles itself to respond militarily to this offensive. This appropriation is not without ambiguity, in particular 
from the technical aspect. Identifying the exact source of the threat is difficult as one of the characterising 
features of the electronic world is the opaqueness that the tool provides. This provides a shield allowing the 
origin of the attack to be shifted onto another player. The ratification by Congress of the National Defense 
Authorization Act now authorizes the DoD to launch offensive operations in cyberspace. The stances taken by 
Defense Secretary Panetta’s stance affirm this trend: “Next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a 
cyber attack”. David E. Sanger, ‘Mutually Assured Cyberdestruction?', New York Times, 2 June 2012, 
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region and the Persian Gulf39.  
 
 
Furthermore, and more fundamentally, access to the global commons is increasingly contested40. The 
United States had the monopoly a decade ago. As Barry Posen pointed out at the time, the United 
States “controls” the global commons. This “does not mean that other countries cannot access these 
zones in times of peace, nor that that they cannot deploy weapons systems if the United States does 
not prevent them. (...) means that the United States, more than any other country, can make 
extensive military use of them; that they can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and that 
they can overcome any State that attempts by force to prevent them from freely using them: the 
challenger will need time to rebuild its forces, while the United States will have no difficuly in 
maintaining, restoring or strengthening their hold after the battle”41. However, the emerging powers 
are no longer lagging behind thanks to the spread of technological capabilities and the relative 
decline of the United States. Though it is dependent in energy and exports, China is not Washington’s 
sole competitor. Other countries also intend to participate in managing these global commons. 
“Countries like China, India and Russia will demand a role in the maintenance of the international 
system, in proportion to their perceived power and their national interests”42. On top of the 
crumbling monopoly there are increasingly prominent tensions in the cyber domain. The United 
States complain of cyberattacks carried out against American private companies and government 
agencies via Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army43. China accuses the United States of 
disinformation and points to the creation of an American “net army”44. 
 
In such a strategic context, the promotion of the global commons is borne by several think tanks, in 
particular the CNAS45 – the Center for a New American Security created in 2007 by Kurt Campbell and 
Michele Flournoy, who was also Under Secretary of Defense from 2009 to 2012 – and the Atlantic 
Council. It has led to splits, however, in terms of the recognition of geographical priorities: the CNAS 
identifies Asia and the Pacific as a primordial zone, followed by the Middle East and Europe while the 
Atlantic Council defends the idea of a global power that does not create hierarchies of the different 
regions of the world. Think tanks attached to the military institution are also reflecting on this issue, 
including the Naval Postgraduate School through group studies headed by Captain Scott Jasper. A 
member of the Center for Civil-Military Relations and the National Security Affairs department, Capt. 
Jasper co-directed a publication on this concept46. 
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Maintaining superiority in the global commons brings about the adoption of a grand strategy that we 
can define as a “sustainment” strategy (in counterpoint to the “containment” strategy which was 
typical of the bipolar period)47. This strategy consists in ensuring there is an American presence in the 
key regions likely to require the deployment of the armed forces48. As such, the CNAS calls for the 
creation of global regimes and agreements that protect and preserve the opening of the global 
commons; for the commitment of prominent actors who can contribute to the longevity of these 
regimes; the remodeling of the American military forces in order to defend and preserve the 
contested global commons, maintain the freedom of manoeuvre for the forces within these spaces 
and outside them, in the event that they may become unusable or inaccessible49. Such an approach 
requires legitimacy, which has been lacking since the choices made by the George W. Bush 
administration.  The transformation of the image projected by the United States is one of the 
fundamental elements that can act as a basis when applying the “sustainment” strategy50. 
 
Let us not forget that such a grand strategy should also serve as a counter-model in regard to the 
possibilities of entrenchment or strategic restraint aimed at protected the American territory in its 
strictest sense. The more the United States step back from the world, the greater the necessity to 
secure the global commons will become difficult, leaving in its wake nationwide vulnerability51. While 
voices are being raised in the hope of relativising the image of the United States as an "indispensable 
nation"52, the Obama administration, on the contrary, spreads the idea of necessary involvement, 
such as the speech given at West Point in 2009, or the expression “America is back”, chanted during 
the second presidential campaign53. This renewed affirmation of American leadership is moving away 
from the ideological messianism born by the neo-conservatism of the previous Bush administration. 
It is not without certain realist aspects, as it is based on the acknowledgement of emerging state 
powers or even the absence of a military engagement without reference to US vital interests54. 
 
The 2010 QDR gives form to the renewed interest in the global commons concept. It launches a 
phase of conceptual, doctrinal and operational enrichment. The concept is conveyed in the 
documents that appeared throughout the interim period between the two QDRs, in particular the 
Defense Strategic Guidance 201255. It is also being developed from the Air-Sea Battle concept56, the 
                                                          
47
 This strategy can also be defined as “offshore balancing”: maintaining access to key regions, preserving the 
global commons and securing critical points. For more on this grand strategy, see Franck Hoffmann, “Forward 
Partnership:  A Sustainable American Strategy”, Orbis, Winter 2013, p. 27 and s. 
48
 Michele Flournoy, Janine Davidson, op. cit., p. 63. 
49
 Abraham M. Denmark, Dr. James Mulvenon, ed., Contested Commons: the future of American power in a 
multipolar world, CNAS, January 2010. 
50
 Shawn Brimley, “A Grand Strategy of Sustainment”, Small Wars Journal Blog, 25 March 2008. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-grand-strategy-of-sustainment 
51
 Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, William C. Wohlforth, “Lean Forward: In Defense of American 
Engagement”, Foreign Affairs, January 2013. 
52
 See, for example, the work by Vali Nasr entitled Dispensable Nation, published in March 2013. 
53
 On this point, see Corine Lesnes, “La politique étrangère de Barack Obama: la tentation du repli?” in 
Bertrand Badie, Dominique Vidal, L'Etat du monde 2014, Paris, La découverte, 2013, pp. 98-99. 
54
 On the realist qualification of Obama's foreign policy, see Zaki Laïdi, Le monde selon Obama. La politique 
étrangère des Etats-Unis, Paris, Flammarion, 2012, p. 118 et s. 
55
 US Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 
Century Defense, January 2012. Among the ten key tasks identified, two concern the global commons issue: 3. 
Force projection despite anti-access 5. The necessity of carrying out efficient operations in cyberspace and the 
atmosphere.  The document formalises the “pivot” concept, a term coined by Hillary Clinton in 2010 in 
ACCESS TO THE GLOBAL COMMONS AND GRAND STRATEGIES 
15 
 
Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)57, the Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force 
(CSDJF)58, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 2012 (CCJO)59, and the Joint Forcible Entry 
Operations concept60. 
 
The common theme of these documents is preparation for a future war of high intensity, against a 
“peer competitor” in the form of a state or another player.  Another of their aims is to ensure 
strategic freedom of action in any deployment zone. As the JOAC indicates: 
“as a global power with global interests, the United States must maintain its projection capacity for 
military forces within any region of the world in order to protect its own interests. This includes the 
entitlement to project forces both within the global commons in order to make full use of them and 
on foreign territories if necessary”61. This text corresponds to a sweeping prospective movement 
concerning the definition of interventions and the makeup of forces from now to 2020 (Joint Force 
2020). While the Air Sea Battle concept is not yet seen as a consolidated doctrine62, it is symptomatic 
of a major concern at the strategic level that clearly aims to "render the air and naval forces more 
interoperable in order to prevent the enemy from destroying or overcoming their anti-access or area 
denial capabilities”63.  
 
Three additional remarks can be made here. Firstly, this promotion of the Air-Sea Battle concept is in 
relation to the Asia-Pacific pivot logic, in that it identifies an interstate war scenario, essentially 
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against China64. As such, Andrew Marshall and Andrew Krepinevich alerted the Pentagon to this type 
of military configuration by organising a simulation entitled “Pacific Vision” for the US Air Force in 
October 200865.  
 
Furthermore, the global commons follow on from the discussions launched in the 1990s concerning 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Indeed, they fit perfectly into the movement towards 
improved technology that the military is currently experiencing. They are based on a “holistic 
approach that dissolves the separation between domains and sees the global commons not as 
distinct geographical entities but rather as a complex and interactive system"66. Taking the example 
of a naval operation, Captain Redden and Colonel Hughes highlight the fact that force projection 
requires real time delivery of electronic information by network (cyberspace support) and the use of 
the Global Positioning System (GPS) (by satellite). In the Defense Strategic Guidance of 5 January 
2012, this holistic approach is formulated67. In view of adopting such a strategic posture, a 
bureaucratic decision was made in November 2011: an Air- Sea strategy coordination bureau was 
created within the Pentagon. Its aim is to prevent anti-access and strengthen the technological 
capabilities required to navigate the global commons68. 
 
Lastly, the task organisation between the global commons and trade development should be 
highlighted: “though generally underestimated, the military role of the United States as a guardian of 
the global commons, in particular the high seas, has made possible the free circulation of goods 
across the world, thereby facilitating both peace and prosperity”69. This use of force in order to 
ensure an access to markets and the boom of trade exchanges is one of the aspects of this grand 
strategy. It also aligns with the “pivot” logic, an equally extensive concept.  It is not limited to the 
geographical dimension (from the Middle-East to Asia and the Pacific). It includes two other points 
where shifts have occurred since the Bush administration: the priority given to emerging powers 
compared to the old European powers (with the idea that the United States cannot create a 
hierarchy amongst these various actors, due to their “pivot power”) and the shift from a military to 
an economic focus70. This second aspect is growing stronger with the new priority in Obama’s foreign 
policy during his second mandate: trade and, in particular, the goal of doubling American exports 
between now and 2015. The relationship between the global commons and trade reflects an 
advocation of freedom in its widest sense (freedom of navigation is becoming a theme applicable to 
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other domains, in particular the cyber domain today71). 
 
The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance insists on the necessary cooperation of the United States with 
its allies in order to assure effective access to the global commons. This posture is mentioned again in 
the preparatory documents for the defense budget 201472. In other words, the drafting of a Grand 
Strategy for the US includes the projection of the concept onto other organisational contexts and, 
primarily, the Atlantic alliance. 
 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL PROJECTION OF THE CONCEPT 
 
In a context of financial crisis, the Obama administration is attempting to “share the responsibility”73 
of the strategic management of the global commons. This approach is evident first and foremost 
within NATO. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the Atlantic Alliance stands strong, defying the 
most pessimistic predictions since 1991. The Alliance found new functions to give reason to its 
existence74 without the presence of an enemy, or, as Lucien Poirier might say, in an atmosphere 
characterised by “strategic waiting”75. Such a procedure is based on the identification of new threats 
and new challenges76. The Allied Command Transformation (ACT) produced several documents to 
give a new outline to NATO policies, such as the “Multiple Futures Project” published in 2009. 
According to General Mattis – Supreme Allied Commander Transformation at that time – the project 
involves strengthening “our understanding of the environment of future threats through thorough 
analysis of the security challenges”77. The report highlights that the global commons are a 
component of this environment both in the short and long term in the 21st century: “Our enemies 
will want to attack our populations, our trading centres and our globally integrated economy, 
including our social networks, and the global commons that we use to connect and prosper. The 
enemies will take the initiative and take advantage of the Alliance’s weaknesses, both in the physical 
and virtual domains of the global commons, including the seas, space and cyberspace”78. Even 
though the new strategic concept adopted at Lisbon does not make explicit reference to the global 
commons, several paragraphs suggest a proactive role for NATO in this field: “All countries are 
increasingly connected to communication systems, transport systems and transit routes that are 
necessary for international trade, energy, security and prosperity. They require an extra international 
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effort in order to ensure they are resilient to attacks or disturbances”79. 
 
In 2010, ACT organised a large council to discuss the concepts and practices that concern the global 
commons. This council led to the drafting of a report that compares the commons to a “useful 
telescope to help assess key security issues”80. Following on from the QDR 2010, it stresses the 
necessary access to the global commons. Since any enemy will take the advantage by restricting the 
movements of NATO allies, they will attempt to block access to them. By pursuing this objective, they 
would paralyse NATO, and worse still, prevent it from fulfilling its tasks, which is to guarantee 
transatlantic security. It follows that, “in the coming decade, the Alliance will confront an adversary 
that will pose a series of risks concerning the use of our military forces in the four domains (sea, air, 
space, cyberspace)”81. The report ends with a series of recommendations on the capabilities of 
Member States82. Above all, the ACT proposes that NATO takes on a leading role in the defense of 
the global commons. This prospect fulfils a need: that of redefining the transatlantic alliance in a new 
political era where the enemy has taken on a new shape. This reorientation of objectives is hinged on 
the US’ conceptual projection. 
 
This projection can be traced to two levels. The first is the ACT’s boosted appeals to concept 
entrepreneurs in the US by organising workshops. A notable contribution during the consultation 
with the expert community came from the Atlantic Council. The Council’s International Security 
Program hosted one of the meetings organised by ACT on February 3, 2011 and was a partner for 
other workshops from July 201083. The second level is at the heart of the organisation, because the 
main defenders of the concept in the ACT are military personnel or American functionaries. They are 
the ones who are in favour of the promotion of the global commons, acting as intermediaries 
between experts and academics84. Furthermore, when he completed his appointment as Supreme 
Alllied Commander Europe, Admiral Stavridis once again stressed the importance of the global 
commons in the organisation’s activities, whether in the positive result of missions undertaken in the 
combat against maritime piracy or in identifying the context of wars to come85. Such a strategy of 
internationalisation faces a rather significant obstacle, however:  the lack of appropriation by the 
other Member States, in particular Britain86. 
 
This conceptual and doctrinal development along with the NATO projection under the Obama 
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administration has received a certain amount of criticism in the academic community87. This criticism 
is even stronger among the leaders of emerging states.  
 
 
 
 OBJECTION TO A GRAND STRATEGY  
 
Faced with the reformulation of American strategy, the emerging powers have not coordinated their 
response despite that fact that they are all driven by the same opposition to Western powers88. 
Furthermore, the creation of regular fora, and even the birth of a unique diplomatic system such as 
IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) has not led to the creation of an institutionalised alliance. The States 
in question prefer a strategic partnership with a much more flexible format89. Even though certain 
structures created have led to common military manoeuvres such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO), their goal is not to form an alliance strictly speaking; in other words, according to 
Stefan Bergsmann's definition, "an explicit agreement between States in the field of national 
security" through which “the partners promise mutual assistance in the form of substantial 
contributions of resources in the event of a situation arising that may become unstable”90. These 
structures, while aiming to standardise relations by providing extra mutual surveillance or 
neutralisation instruments (in the case of the SCO), the different perspectives of risks and threats 
prevent the formation of a strategically coherent unit that could lead to the birth of an international 
security community. The territorial anchoring is far too varied. This absence of strategic structure 
renders comparisons to a "new Cold War” or the “balance of power” system of pre-191491, 
inaccurate. It also generates multiple objections92 to the American posture, as evidenced in the 
Chinese and Russian examples. Such stances share a common feature, in that they are embedded in 
the regional environment of the two powers in question. 
 
 
CHINA’S AFFIRMATION 
 
The very term “global commons” is little used in Chinese speeches, be they political, in media 
coverage or academic. It does not have the status of a strategic concept represented in doctrine. 
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However, behind this relative discretion hides a strategic concern in terms of the “protection of” and 
the “access to” these spaces. This concern can be seen in the discourse, the analysis and a refocusing 
effort. 
 
The discourse does not reside in the use of the “global commons” as an expression but rather in the 
taking up of several specific positions.  China is opposed to the weaponization of space93, promotes 
greater cooperation in the field of computer and electronic networks94, and raises questions over the 
development of military capabilities in these areas95. All of these elements are in line with the 
peaceful development that China advocates: “China will not engage in invasion, plundering, war or 
expansion that Western powers used to practice. Our strength will be harnessed to serve world 
peace and integrate development with peace”. 96 
 
Nonetheless, a dual diagnosis appears when interpreting these strategic trends. The U.S. interest in 
the global commons is seen as a desire to increase the American stronghold over them97. Meanwhile, 
the consideration for this strategic concern pertaining to the global commons is essential in order to 
ensure Chinese prosperity. This is closely tied to the connecting points through which Chinese 
products travel98. More generally, the development of the country also depends on energy resources, 
in particular the oil necessary for the rapid growth of the world’s second-largest economy. In 
September 2013, China became the world’s leading importer with 6.3 million barrels bought every 
day99. Securing the sea routes between the Middle East and the Gulf of China has therefore become 
a strategic priority which has resulted in the strengthening of Chinese naval capabilities and also the 
control of the Straits of Malacca, through which 85% of imports pass. 
 
Lastly, the People’s Republic of China is beginning to refocus in its head-on approach to the global 
commons, in relation to the United States. This refocusing is first and foremost limited to the Asia 
region100. It is part of the development of a “total” power – i.e. the consolidating of material and non-
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material resources – the primary aim being stability in its immediate neighbouring areas101. However, 
three significant sources of friction between China and the US clearly indicate the regional rivalry for 
the global commons for over a decade. 
 
The first is due to a collision between a Navy plane (EP-3) and a Shenyang J8 from the Chinese navy, 
resulting in the death of the pilot in April 2001 close to the island of Hainan (Chinese naval base with 
nuclear submarines), which is just above the PRC’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea. 
The twenty-four members of the EP-3 crew were forced to carry out an emergency landing for 
interrogation. The Bush Administration had to give a public apology in order to end the diplomatic 
crisis. 
 
The second issue arose in the same zone but at sea (120 km from Hainan Island). On 8th March 2009 
the “Impeccable” ocean surveillance ship (with a civilian crew employed by the US Navy) was 
approached by five Chinese ships that ordered it to leave the zone in question. The distance between 
the ships was so close that the Impeccable used its fire hoses to effectively perform the manoeuvres. 
 
The last of these friction factors concerns cyberspace access. On 13 January 2010, Google announced 
it had been subjected to several massive attacks coming from China. Using classic phishing methods 
and malware, several accounts belonging to Chinese militants for human rights in China and abroad 
were targeted. Following the creation of Google.cn in 2006, this episode was seen by the company’s 
directors as well as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as an attack on freedom of expression. 
 
In the three cases, the US exercises the right to freedom of navigation, both in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone or in cyberspace. However, China responds by asserting its sovereign rights in this 
field102, in particular through the application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, for the first 
instance. Indeed, this reference to the law reflects a form of normative socialisation of China, as it 
adheres to a series of principles and rules that have their origin in modern Europe and are today 
enshrined in international conventions103.  
 
Such claims do however have a purpose: assert and even extend the Chinese security perimeter in 
relation to the United States, whose presence in the Asia-Pacific region is considered even more 
worrying than a nuclearised North Korea... It is a strategic response104. The priority is to dissuade or 
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neutralise the American forces nearby or deployable in the region105. 
 
The creation of C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance), designed to render defense system components more interoperable and 
increase submarines, or the construction of Type 054A frigates and rocket-launching Type 022 
catamarans, reflect the development of such a strategic posture106. The idea of "offshore active 
defense” developed by Admiral Liu and which could extend much further than the region should not 
be startling. China’s key ambition would appear to be the preservation of its leadership in the 
region107 and therefore “push back any American military presence from its borders”108. 
 
Beyond the move towards capability reinforcement or this notion of strategy, we must also highlight 
the extension of China’s “fundamental interests” in 2010. While its “core interests” were limited to 
Taiwan and Tibet in 2002 according to Wang Jisi (a close friend of Hu Jintao), they now include claims 
to the regional maritime zone109. The national borders have therefore become a domestic policy 
concern, with certain military leaders unhesitant to declare “Chinese rights to an oceanic territory of 
three million km2”110. 
 
The creation of a “red telephone line”, a direct line for emergencies between the two States 
(whether on the diplomatic level since 1998 or the strategic level between the People’s Liberation 
Army and the Pentagon since 2007) will not prevent this clearly defined Chinese objective from 
waning: total priority is given to sovereignty111, conceived of in an extensive perspective. 
 
 
RUSSIAN ASSERTION RENEWED 
 
With Vladimir Putin’s coming to office, from the year 2000 the Russian Federation’s foreign policy 
was marked by a reassertion of Russian power in the “near abroad” – the region of preferential 
interests – but also beyond this region112. The strategic issues concerning the global commons come 
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under this policy113 all the same, and just like in China, the concept itself does not appear stricto 
sensu in official documents, such as the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation of 5 February 
2010. The US policy in Russia’s neighbouring region, and globally, is considered a threat to 
international security114. As such, the primary external military threat identified by Russia is the 
enlargement of NATO in its “near abroad” as well as the Alliance’s intention to become a strategic 
actor with global functions115. This is fully coherent with the analyses formulated in the Foreign Policy 
doctrine adopted in 2008116. 
 
Based on this strategic assessment, Russia has adopted measures that aim to strengthen its military 
capabilities deployed in the global commons, an anti-access strategy (at the conventional or 
dissuasion levels) and an appropriation posture in the Arctic Ocean. 
 
In terms of capability development, it is essentially in the naval and cybernetic domain that the most 
significant progress is being made. In October 2008, Russia provided a frigate in the anti-piracy 
combat in Somalia, but it simultaneously organised exercises with the Venezuelan navy (the first in 
the Western hemisphere since the end of the Cold War). Between 2007 and 2015, the Russian 
weapons programme has allocated 25% of its 4.9 billion rouble defense budget to the building of 
new warships.  In the cyber domain, Russia is strengthening its assets and their usage, as 
demonstrated in the war in Georgia, defined as “hybrid combat”, as a series of cyberattacks 
accompanied force deployment. It also seeks to support “hacktivists” (politically active hackers) by 
making them “information soldiers”117.  
 
As for the anti-access strategy, it was put to use in the war in Georgia, as Russia threatened to sink a 
NATO ship suspected of providing military support to the enemy under cover of a humanitarian aid 
operation. In the spatial domain, Russia can rely on its know-how and experience from the Soviet era, 
in particular since 1968 with the first anti-satellite capability test118. This skill is used for dissuasion, as 
it bolsters its strategic credibility (an essential component for perceptions). 
 
Lastly, in 2007, several Russian explorers descended to a depth of over 4,000 metres in the Arctic 
Ocean. The planting of a titanium Russian flag at its bottom is considered as an extension of the 
continental shelf, and therefore a form of appropriation of the Arctic commons by Russia. 
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The positions adopted by China and Russia can therefore be interpreted as responses to the actions 
undertaken by the United States, if we accept the classic rules of strategy. By accumulating resources 
of power which are both economic and military in nature, any actor will come up against forms of 
resistance, more or less in the long term.  As such, a rise will suffer a setback which may be partial or 
whole depending on the reactions it causes119. 
 
 
 
 A CONCEPT REVEALING STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATIONS: A SHIFT TOWARDS NEW GLOBAL 
INTERPLAY 
 
Protecting and preserving freedom of action in the global commons requires evading the adversary’s 
technological assets120, and using powerful instruments provided by the information revolution121.  
This way, the global commons can even be compared to a catalyst that subsumes all technological 
innovation in order to give it a strategic purpose. 
 
Nonetheless, this change is merely the tip of the iceberg. A new global interplay is beginning to take 
form. It no longer follows the “grand chessboard” concept developed by Brzezinski, which consisted, 
for the United States and any of it rivals, in controlling Eurasia. This new interplay has other 
characteristics. It focuses on freedom of movement in the global commons. This grand interplay is 
not without consequences, in that it expands the possible areas of military clashes while 
simultaneously risking the militarisation of spaces that were not originally militarised.  
 
 
AN EXTENSIVE NOTION OF THE STRATEGIC “SANCTUARY” 
 
The interplay within the global commons involves firstly identifying the elements that are a part of 
them. The United States’ idea of what composes the global commons is rather vast. China is stricter 
when it involves regional spaces, which implies the development of patrols, surveillance and military 
exercises within them. In those areas, China accepts the movement of goods or civilian air transport 
as well as shared use of resources. It does not, however, tolerate military presence or use of these 
spaces by the United States. 
 
These two different positions tend to give rise to an opposition in the great global interplay:  
between freedom of movement on the one hand, and the “Balkanisation”122 of the global commons 
on the other. This “Balkanisation” is perceived both negatively and critically as an unacceptable 
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violation of the circulation of goods and persons. The two antagonist perspectives nonetheless 
reflect a similar trend: an extensive notion of the “strategic sanctuary”. This is no longer limited to 
the territory where the heart of national identity lies123. 
 
Freedom of movement in the global commons for the United States is based, for example, on 
another strategic depiction. This manner of perceiving threat goes beyond that which reigned when 
the European states were formed, summed up in Charles Tilly’s famous words:  “War made the state, 
and the state makes war”. These European states were formed through the accumulation of two 
types of resources: subjugation (control of the civilian population and weapons manufactured in 
order to assert the central power) and capital (institutionalisation of taxes and resorting to credit in 
order to create an armed force). This accumulation may assume certain unique features depending 
on the proportion of these resources: Venice has taken a highly capitalised route; Russia meanwhile 
relies on a high concentration of restrictive methods while states such as France or the United 
Kingdom are characterised by the constraints of capital.   These three routes align with a unique 
structural trend: “seeking to create and utilise warmaking capabilities to their advantage”124. 
Definitively, “the structure of the State seems to mainly be a by-product of the governing power’s 
efforts to acquire warfare assets” and “the relationship between States, especially during war and 
preparation for it, strongly affected the entire State-creating process”125. Such state-building results 
in two consequences, from the viewpoint of modern strategic thinking. Firstly, war is the incarnation 
of a state-to-state relationship and not a man-to-man relationship. Rousseau puts this into words in 
the fourth chapter of Book 1 of The Social Contract: “a State can only have other States as its 
enemies, and not men”126. Secondly, war systematically results in the defining and protecting of 
borders, since the basis of international principles is keeping the enemy at bay. The territory 
relationship embodies a major element of the state-building process, which is driven by the refusal of 
a European empire, irrespective of who would benefit from it (the Habsburgs or the Bourbons).  The 
development of military and strategic skills is based on a number of models, like that of geometry or 
even “psychology”127 but it remains rooted in the soil: taking control of the territories in order to 
assert and strengthen the State. To cite Elias’s terminology, the State seeks to build itself as a survival 
unit128. To put it plainly, defence policy is a keystone of the state as an entity129. 
 
Today, these two corollaries are subjects of debate. A number of sociologists depict the 
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transformation of the State under the effects of a second modernity (Beck) or a radicalisation of 
modernity (Giddens). In both cases, the territorial relationship undergoes significant transformation. 
According to Beck, globalisation gives rise to a new definition of the characteristics of sovereignty 
and renders the control of space illusory, as a world of danger and risks has gradually replaced a 
world of adversaries130. For Giddens, keeping a distance has increasingly less sense, politically, due to 
the disconnect between time and space: “the intensifying of planetary social relations brings distant 
places so much closer that local events are influence by events that occur thousands of kilometres 
away and vice-versa”131.  
 
Beyond anti-access and area denial, it is the idea of an expansion of the “sanctuary” which is at work 
in US defence policy today. The idea is to remove the territorial constraints132. A number of projects 
in the cyber domain illustrates this quite well, such as “commotion”, created by Sacha Meinhart 
(former hactivist). It involves generating fully standalone wifi networks with no physical 
infrastructure. The State Department is financing the project with over two million euro: “there are 
three objectives: re-establish a connection in areas hit by natural disasters or war, distant areas that 
are difficult to access, and of course, evade the censorship imposed by certain dictatorships. This last 
aspect pushes the objectives of digital diplomacy (or e-diplomacy) even further, seeking to defeat 
other powers”133. 
Integrating the global commons as a component of a grand strategy transmitted to a military alliance 
and with a different relationship to territory as an objective could also be compatible with the notion 
of “hegemonic stability”. This idea of expansion is hinged on a qualification: the United States is a 
“liberal hegemon”134 that seeks to maintain its status135. 
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FROM MILITARISATION TO WEAPONISATION ? 
 
The promotion of the global commons concept results in a form of militarisation of these commons. 
That is, the employment of assets placed in these spaces in order to support military operations. 
These spaces thereby allow telecommunication lines to be maintanined, navigation assured and thus 
the deployment of armed forces, as well as the capacity to observe the manoeuvres of other states. 
Nevertheless, the grand interplay may eventually set in motion a more threatening process in the 
form of a weaponisation of these spaces, i.e. the installation of convetional weapons. As an example, 
even though the United States, Russia and China signed the 1967 treaty banning weapons of mass 
destruction in the atmosphere, they may however envisage installing anti-missile defense systems or 
anti-satellite weapons. Another possible scenario is the martialisation of these spaces, consisting in 
placing objects that are inoffensive on their own, "but which make up a combat system (for example: 
space mirrors for reflecting aggressive laser beams)”136. The militarisation, weaponisation or 
martialisation of the global commons revives the hypothesis of a state war in which these spaces 
provide the context as well as the target. 
 
While essentially a state-related phenomenon in modern times, war is changing shape due to the 
diminishing role played by the nation-state: the confrontation between two state armies is no longer 
the main model of contemporary wars (rise of non-governmental actors as key figures, development 
of private security companies and hiring of mercenaries). On top of this we can also mention what 
Jean Joana described as the “autonomisation” of war, which escapes the initial rationale that 
presides at the outbreak of hostilities137. However, the increasing militarisation of the global 
commons tends to disprove the hypothesis of a growing demonopolisation of the military element at 
the states’ expense. 
 
Not only is the building up of military resources a priority, including for the U.S which is experiencing 
a period of budgetary sequestration, but the collision zone with the other states is at risk of reaching 
new dimensions. This is the reason why Chinese thinkers have come up with the concept of a war 
without limits, which blurs the usual distinguishing lines in terms of strategic thinking. There is no 
longer a refuge or preserved space because “for war without limits, the distinction between the 
battlefield and the combat-free zone does not exist. The natural spaces embodied by the land, the 
sea, the air and space are battlefields; the social spaces incarnated by the military, political, 
economic, cultural and psychological fields are battlefields”138.  This configuration leads to the 
emergence of “omnidimensional combat”139, in that “the theory of operations integrated in the real 
world, (...) through its vastness, goes far beyond what had been initially envisaged and covers a vast 
field that includes land, sea, air, space and cyberspace”140. 
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Etzioni offers a similar conclusion. For him, the Air-Sea Battle Concept takes the form of “a major 
strategic change” as an “intellectual pivot”141. Its purpose is not to accommodate China but 
encourage tensions with it142. According to Etzioni, the concept serves an American posture that 
creates conditions conducive to the outbreak of war with Beijing, since it favorises the perception of 
increasingly hostile encirclement143. He sees it as a reflection of an impossible convergence of views 
between the two States, and a way of formalising a war scenario (absence of belief in peacefully 
resolving their differences). As such, the state of bilateral relations is more of a “collision course”144 
than strategic cooperation, despite the fact that several experts call for the latter to be strengthened 
or even a new “relationship between great powers”145.  
 
This expansion of the nature of war is also due to the fact that the security dilemma is no longer 
limited to a strictly material and territorial component. The security dilemma in terms of the global 
commons comes from the perception of the possibility to access them (or not). The motivation 
comes from the fact that these spaces are vital for States to function, or to cite Rousseau, for their 
“political bodies”, irrespective of the nature of the regime. The United States, Russia and China draw 
elements from these spaces that are fundamental to their own economic development, i.e. vital for 
the functioning of the political body itself. 
 
Of course, the current configuration raises questions over both the necessity and the suitability of 
resorting to armed force, which may weaken the national cohesion of States as well as their 
economic development.  As Chris Brown points out, “whereas in the past it was common for rising 
powers to feel that they had to define their new status by challenging existing power-holders, 
building empires and “co-prosperity” spheres, (...) this is no longer necessary, and indeed may be 
even more counterproductive than previously”146. Nonetheless, we cannot simply sweep aside the 
possibility of an interstate clash caused by friction in the global commons unresolved diplomatically. 
This type of confrontation may take on a latent aspect (absence of a declaration of war or outspoken 
protest) whilst infiltrating the civilian and private sector fields147. The term “sub rosa warfare” in the 
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cyber domain is a part of this strategic trend which goes beyond intelligence or special operations. It 
involves confidential and secret combat, as none of the parties declare themselves to be at war148. 
 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
Three conclusions may be drawn from this study. 
 
While the global commons are homologous, as they each serve a means of communication, there are 
no ramifications in terms of strategic thinking, which remains oriented by a need for the greatest 
freedom of action possible when deploying armed forces within the commons. While on the tactical 
level, these spaces render offensive operations easier to implement, including under cover (i.e. 
cyber), they do not call into question the freedom principle as the common core of any strategic 
action. 
 
Furthermore, the Obama administration is reawakening the concept of the global commons, 
making them a cornerstone of a new grand strategy in order to show that 1. These spaces are 
essential for future interventions (global commons as a strategic asset) and 2. That they are thus 
becoming a new site for clashes (global commons as a strategic target). 
 
Lastly, the global commons have not risen to the status of structural concept in the Grand 
strategies of China or Russia. Nonetheless, they are very much taken into consideration as symptoms 
of present-day American behaviour. As such, the grand strategies drawn up consist in incorporating a 
response to this American posture by considering the assets that would prevent or neutralise the 
military or civilian resources in close proximity to the states concerned. While the global commons 
have left no conceptual traces in the grand strategies of these two emerging powers - for the most 
part already “emerged” or “re-emerged” – the issues linked to access to the commons are clearly 
manifested. 
 
Analysts today stress the reactivation of the maritime element on the strategic stage, following a 
decade of armed force deployment to combat insurrection (such as in Iraq and Afghanistan)149. More 
generally, however, a new, major global interplay is emerging, with the specific notion of freedom of 
movement in the global commons. Such interplay may become the basis for a militarisation, even 
weaponisation, of domains that had been preserved from such phenomena until now. These trends 
contribute to the steady establishment of a “state of war”, which is not limited, however, to a "state 
of violence"150, which is evidenced through the proliferation of combat methods within civilian or 
private spaces.  This state of war is due to the way the political bodies themselves function. 
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 Libicki, M. C.,  “Sub Rosa Cyber War” in C. Czossek & K. Geers, eds., The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on 
Cyber Warfare, Amsterdam, Netherlands, IOS Press, 2009, pp. 53-65. 
149
 “ The central role of the sea in the conduct of land affairs will inevitably grow stronger in coming years.  Its 
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150
 Expression used by Frédéric Gros in Etats de violence. Essai sur la fin de la guerre, Paris, Gallimard, 2006. 
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Modern rules of strategy were based on the idea of a territory to protect or expand. They originated, 
according to Rousseau, in the fact that countries did not have a naturally defined greatness. Forced 
to compare themselves to one another in order to discover their limits, they found themselves in a 
constant state of war. Armed clashes were also given a purpose according to Rousseau: it held 
citizens together, like the muscles of a single body151. Today, the risks of war are no longer due to 
this need for comparison, or “ostentation” in Rousseau’s words152, but rather the desire to access 
the global commons, considered to be vital for the existence and even the social and economic 
viability of the political bodies in question.  With such a setup, an even more extensive "all against 
all" state of war could develop153. 
 
Consequently, a new tragedy arises for the commons. During the 1970s, the use of natural resources 
in the global commons caused these resources to diminish, justifying the remark made by Garret 
Hardin who believed that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all”154. Today, it is the states’ 
attempts to control the commons that is contributing to another tragedy: controlling the commons 
militarily would appear to bring ruin for all. While a lack of interest was what characterized the 
dilemma described by Hardin in his time, today’s dilemma is quite the opposite, with the desire to 
control and even appropriate these spaces becoming increasingly apparent155. 
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